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ASSAULT-RELATED CONDUCT UNDER THE
PROPOSED CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL CODE
In 1872 the California Legislature defined criminal assault as "an
unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent
injury on the person of another."' Today, the adequacy of this defini-
tion is being questioned by the California Legislature as it endeavors to
revise the Penal Code and enact a new Criminal Code.2 The purpose
of this note is to encourage the legislature to enact revisions of the as-
sault-related offenses which define with particularity the types of con-
duct which should be punished.
This note first will analyze the current law of criminal assault in
California and will illustrate the role which the courts have played in
shaping it.3 Particular attention will be paid to three distinct prob-
lems of judicial interpretation: the present ability requirement, the in-
tent requirement, and the relationship between the statutory definition
of assault and the statutory definition of general criminal attempt. This
initial part of the discussion will describe the sphere of conduct punish-
able by California's current definition of assault. This part of the
note will also question the adequacy of the current legislative definition
of assault as a guide for judicial interpretation.
The note will next review and criticize the proposed offenses of
"aggressive conduct" and "aggravated criminal injury" which would
replace the current Penal Code offenses of assault and aggravated as-
sault if the proposed Criminal Code is enacted into law. This part of
the note will demonstrate that the proposed offenses would do little
more than change the names and rearrange the present definitions of
assault and aggravated assault.
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 240 (West 1970).
2. The Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code was formed
in 1963. The Committee published three tentative drafts between 1967 and 1969. The
project was reorganized in 1969 to include a full-time staff composed of a project
director and two attorneys who prepared a staff draft of the proposed Criminal Code
with the aid of an Advisory Board. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. FOR REVISION OF THE
PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL CODE ill (Staff Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL CODE
DRAFT]. A bill to enact a new criminal code was introduced in the California Legisla-
ture on January 15, 1973, and was passed by the Senate on January 21, 1974. S.B.
39, § 1 (1973), as amended Jan. 21, 1974 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 39].
3. See text accompanying notes 7-64 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 65-86 infra.
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The note will finally describe the trend in the law of criminal as-
sault. This trend can be discerned by examining the definitions of
assault-related conduct in the Model Penal Code and the New York Pe-
nal Law of 1965 which have been adopted in nine states.' This last
part of the discussion will demonstrate that the tendency in these nine
jurisdictions is to abandon the common law definition of assault by de-
fining attempts to inflict physical injury 6 as they have defined other at-
tempts to commit crimes. They have achieved this result by eliminat-
ing the requirement of present ability and by specifically requiring that
a person must have intended to injure another person in order to be
guilty of an attempt to inflict injury. Further, these jurisdictions have
expanded the common law concept of criminal assault by including
variations of the tort definition of assault and by punishing reckless
conduct which creates a substantial risk of causing injury to another.
This note will demonstrate that while the tendency in other juris-
dictions has been to redefine assault, the California Legislature has
failed to do so in the proposed Criminal Code. This note criticizes both
the current Penal Code definition of assault and the proposed Criminal
Code definitions of "aggressive conduct" and "aggravated criminal in-
jury" in order to encourage the legislature to amend the proposed of-
fenses so that they more clearly proscribe that conduct which should be
punished.
California's Present Definition of Assault
At common law, criminal assault was defined as an attempt to
commit a battery; 7 a battery was any nonconsensual application of
force to another person's body regardless of whether that force inflicted
pain or injury.' This common law meaning of battery was incorpor-
ated into the California Penal Code's definition of battery as "any will-
ful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another."9
Although California's definition of criminal assault is essentially that
of the common law, the original drafters of the Penal Code specific-
ally included a requirement of present ability to commit a battery.
Hence, the Penal Code currently defines assault as "an unlawful at-
tempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another."'"
It has been necessary for the California courts to construe this statu-
5. See text accompanying notes 90-131 infra.
6. For purposes of this note, the term "injury" refers to physical injury only.
7. R. PEuKNs, PERxiNs ON Culmn'iA LAw 114 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as PEpKNS].
8. PERKINS, supra note 7, at 107-11.
9. CAL. PEN. CODE § 242 (West 1970).
10. Id. § 240 (West 1970); see People v. Yslas, 27 Cal. 630 (1865).
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tory definition. The three areas of judicial interpretation which are
crucial to an understanding of the current Penal Code definition of as-
sault involve the present ability requirement, the intent requirement,
and the relationship between criminal assault and attempts to commit
other crimes.
The Present Ability Requirement
By specifically requiring present ability, the original drafters of
the Penal Code recognized that a greater degree of proximity is required
to commit an assault than is required for attempts to commit other
crimes. 1 But while the requirement of present ability has narrowed
the scope of criminal assault, it has been necessary for the courts to
determine just how narrow that scope is because the California Penal
Code does not define present ability.
Present ability under the common law meant being within strik-
ing distance. 12 California courts, however, have expanded this com-
mon law interpretation of present ability; the requirement is satisfied
under the present definition of assault when a battery would have re-
sulted if the actor had not been interrupted.13 This broader interpreta-
tion means that the present ability requirement is met if the actor had
the means' 4 to carry out the battery and if he were sufficienly close to
his victim so that the infliction of some type of unlawful touching
would have been a reasonable certainty if the actor's conduct had not
been interrupted in some way.'" For example, in 1925 an appellate
court found the requisite present ability to commit an assault with a
deadly weapon when it was shown that the defendant threatened to
shoot his victim with a loaded gun which he had concealed in his
sock. "'6 By contrast, an earlier supreme court decision in 1888 had
held that the defendant's brandishing a knife while not being able to
11. PEnmNs, supra note 7, at 118-19.
12. Id. at 119.
13. See People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 2d 177, 153 P.2d 315 (1944); People v. Bird,
60 Cal. 7 (1881); People v. Macias, 77 Cal. App. 2d 71, 174 P.2d 895 (1946); People
v. Hunter, 71 Cal. App. 315, 235 P. 67 (1925); People v. Montgomery, 15 Cal. App.
315, 114 P. 792 (1911).
14. See, e.g., Pittman v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. App. 2d 795, 64 Cal. Rptr. 473
(1967) (loaded firearm); People v. Nichols, 255 Cal. App. 2d 217, 62 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1967) (knife); People v. Hahn, 147 Cal. App. 2d 308, 305 P.2d 192 (1956) (beer
can); People v. Fuentes, 74 Cal. App. 2d 737, 169 P.2d 391 (1946) (hands); People
v. Bradley, 71 Cal. App. 2d 114, 162 P.2d 38 (1945) (car); People v. Mitchell, 40
Cal. App. 2d 204, 104 P.2d 545 (1940) (bottle).
15. E.g., People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 2d 177, 153 P.2d 315 (1944); People v. Pena,
25 Cal. App. 3d 414, 101 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1972); People v. Livingston, 4 Cal. App. 3d
251, 84 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1970).
16. People v. Hunter, 71 Cal. App. 315, 235 P. 67 (1925).
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come within striking distance of his victim was insuffcient evidence
of present ability. 17
The Intent Requirement
Just as the California Legislature's inclusion of the present ability re-
quirement in the definition of criminal assault has required judicial in-
terpretation of what circumstances satisfy that requirement, so has the
legislature's omission of a mens rea requirement in the definition of
assault.1 ' Because criminal assault was defined legislatively as an at-
tempt with present ability to commit a battery, the intent required for an
assault would seem to be a specific intent to commit a battery. This
inference is supported by cases which have held that an attempt to com-
mit a crime requires a specific intent to commit that crime 9 or at least
some crime.2 0 Nevertheless, the California courts have not had an easy
task defining the nature of the intent required to commit a criminal
assault. While the majority of criminal assault cases in California have
held that a specific intent to commit a battery is not required for the
commission of an assault,21 a number of cases have held that a specific
intent is required. 2 The California Supreme Court faced the problem
17. People v. Dodel, 77 Cal. 293, 19 P. 484 (1888).
18. CAL. PEN. CODE § 240 (West 1970).
19. People v. Goldstein, 146 Cal. App. 2d 268, 303 P.2d 892 (1956) (specific
intent to commit the crime attempted); accord, People v. Miller, 2 Cal. 2d 527, 42
P.2d 308 (1935).
20. People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953) (specific intent to
commit some crime); accord, People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953).
The difference between requiring intent to commit the crime attempted and requiring
intent to commit any crime is not significant. See Comment, Attempt, Solicitation, and
Conspiracy Under the Proposed California Criminal Code, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 603, 604
(1972).
21. See, e.g., People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1971); People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 2d 177, 153 P.2d 315 (1944); People v. Wright, 258
Cal. App. 2d 762, 66 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1968); People v. Sandoval, 222 Cal. App. 2d 348,
35 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1963); People v. Swansboro, 200 Cal. App. 2d 831, 19 Cal. Rptr.
527 (1962); People v. Stephens, 168 Cal. App. 2d 557, 336 P.2d 221 (1959); People v.
Walker, 99 Cal. App. 2d 238, 221 P.2d 287 (1950); People v. Ingram, 91 Cal. App. 2d
912, 206 P.2d 36 (1949); People v. Griffin, 90 Cal. App. 2d 116, 202 P.2d 573 (1949);
People v. Corlett, 67 Cal. App. 2d 33, 153 P.2d 595 (1944); People v. Lim Dum Dong,
26 Cal. App. 2d 135, 78 P.2d 1026 (1938).
22. People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1967); Peo-
ple v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 427 P.2d 820, 59 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1967); People v. Car-
men, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951); People v. Fanning, 265 Cal. App. 2d 729,
71 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1968); People v. Wheeler, 260 Cal. App. 2d 522, 67 Cal. Rptr. 246
(1968); People v. Corson, 221 Cal. App. 2d 579, 34 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1963); People
v. Roshid, 191 Cal. App. 2d 692, 12 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1961); People v. Alexander, 41
Cal. App. 2d 275, 106 P.2d 450 (1940). In 1970, the Committee on Standard Jury
Instructions defined an assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability
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of defining the intent required for an assault in two recent cases. The
court considered the problem in conjunction with a determination of
whether voluntary intoxication would negate the requisite for an assault.
The first of these two cases was People v. Hood,23 a 1969 su-
preme court opinion which confronted, but did not solve, the problem
of the intent required for an assault. In Hood, the evidence tended to
show that the intoxicated defendant had shot at two police officers who
were attempting to subdue him. The supreme court considered at
length whether a specific intent to commit a battery is required for an
assault and concluded that it did not have to decide the issue.24 The
court stated:
[I]n most cases specific intent has come to mean an intention to
do a future act or achieve a particular result, and assault is appro-
priately characterized as a specific intent crime under this defini-
tion. An assault, however, is equally well characterized as a gen-
eral intent crime under the definition of a general intent as the
intent merely to do a violent act. Therefore, whatever reality the
distinction between specific and general intent may have in other
contexts, the difference is chimerical in the case of assault with a
deadly weapon or simple assault. 25
The supreme court followed this analysis in People v. Rocha.
There, the court stated it hoped to "eliminate the confusion on this is-
sue [of the intent required for an assault] which [had] developed
throughout the courts of [the] state. '2 7
The evidence in Rocha tended to show that, during an argu-
ment over who had the right to occupy a bar stool, the defendant had
swung at another man with a knife and had wounded him. Following
his conviction, Rocha appealed and cited as error the trial judge's fail-
ure to instruct the jury on the effect of voluntary intoxication to negate
the intent required to commit an assault with a deadly weapon.28 The
supreme court relied on People v. Hood29 and held that voluntary intoxi-
cation would not negate the requisite intent 0 for two reasons. First,
"[s]ince alcohol is so often a factor inducing simple assaults and as-
saults with a deadly weapon it would be anomalous to permit excul-
and with the specific intent, to commit a wrongful act by means of physical force upon
the person of another." COMMI=EB ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL,
CAIJIC 9.00 (1970) (emphasis added).
23. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
24. Id. at 452-58, 462 P.2d at 374-79, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 622-27.
25. Id. at 457-58, 462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
26. 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1971).
27. Id. at 896, 479 P.2d at 374, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
28. Id. at 896-97, 479 P.2d at 374-75, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75.
29. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
30. 3 Cal. 3d 893, 897-98, 479 P.2d 372, 375, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172, 175 (1971).
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pation because of intoxication."'" This is clearly a consideration of
social policy. Second, the court stated that the nature of the intent re-
quired for an assault is not susceptible to negation by intoxication be-
cause in California 32 only a general, and not a specific, intent to com-
mit a battery is required for an assault. 3  The supreme court indicated
that specific intent to commit an assault is the intention to cause in-
jury whereas the general intent to commit an assault is the general intent
to attempt to commit a battery. It defined this general intent as the
"intent to wilfully commit an act the direct, natural and probable con-
sequences of which if successfully completed would be the injury to an-
other."34
Confusion might arise from the general intent definition in Rocha
because it is difficult to conceive of a situation when someone would
intend to attempt to commit a battery without intending to commit an
actual battery. That is, whenever someone attempts to commit a
substantive crime, regardless of whether the crime requires a specific
intent or a general intent, that person intends to cause the result or to do
the act constituting the substantive crime .3  The attempt is an antici-
patory, not a substantive, crime.36  Thus, because assault is an attempt
to commit a battery, the battery is the substantive crime. For the pur-
pose of this argument, it does not matter whether a battery requires a
specific intent to actually touch or injure another person or whether a
general intent to do a violent act which causes that result is suffi-
cient. Regardless of this distinction, it seems obvious that a person
must intend an actual physical touching to be guilty of an assault. It
is only necessary, however, for him to have intended to cause no more
than the least touching. 7
31. Id. at 898, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
32. The writer's recent research indicates that, unlike California, the majority of
jurisdictions requires specific intent to inflict injury for an assault. See PERKINS, supra
note 7, at 116, 130.
33. 3 Cal. 3d 893, 898-99, 479 P.2d 372, 376-77, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176-77.
34. Id. at 899, 479 P.2d at 376-77, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
35. "The word 'attempt' means to try; it implies an effort to bring about a de-
sired result. Hence an attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to com-
mit that particular offense." PERKINS, supra note 7, at 573 (citations omitted).
36. PERKINS, supra note 7, at 577.
37. See People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d 893, 899, 479 P.2d 372, 377, 92 Cal. Rptr.
172, 177 (1971). The Rocha case itself seems to support this point. While Rocha
holds that the intent required for an assault is only the general intent to commit an
act the probable consequences of which would be an injury to another, a short footnote
commenting upon the court's definition of the intent requirement contradicts that hold-
ing. The footnote states that "[a] battery must be contemplated, but only an 'injury'
as that term is used with respect to a battery need be intended." Id. at 899 n.12,
479 P.2d at 377 n.12, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 177 n.12. The "injury" the court refers to means
the "least touching." Id. It follows from this that an actor must intend at least to
touch another in order to commit an assault. If this is so, then the actor must
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People v. Rocha underscores the major shortcoming of the pres-
ent definition of assault. That is, while assault is statutorily defined
as an attempt to commit a battery with present ability, the courts have
been inclined to view assault as a substantive rather than as an anticipa-
tory crime. In Rocha, the supreme court treated assault as if, unlike
attempts to commit other crimes, it were a crime in which an actor in-
tends to attempt a battery (commit an assault) without intending to
inflict the least touching. The supreme court held in both Hood and
Rocha that considerations of social policy dictate that voluntary intoxi-
cation should not be allowed to negate the mens rea for an assault; but
the court should not have sought additional support for that conclusion
by manipulating the definition of the intent required for an assault.
Attempted Assault
A question related to that of determining the intent required for an
assault is whether the crime of assault is one which can be attempted.
In re James M.88 dealt with this question on first impression. The
supreme court accepted the assault provision as a statutory given89
and then analyzed the relationship between that provision and the Pe-
nal Code's general attempt provision in order to determine whether leg-
islative intent and considerations of judicial administration and public
policy would tolerate the judicial creation of the crime of attempted as-
sault. Because the supreme court's decision in James M. is important
not only for its holding that attempted assault is not a crime punish-
able under the Penal Code but also for its wider implications regarding
the adequacy of the current definition of assault as a guideline for the
courts, the case will be considered here in detail.
In re James M. was originally a proceeding in juvenile court.
James had allegedly hurled an object, determined by the court to have
been a rock, at two policemen who were conducting an interview
with two other youths. At the time James allegedly threw the rock,
he was separated from the policemen by a twelve-foot high fence and
thirty-five feet of pavement. The rock allegedly struck a police vehi-
cle which was located approximately eight feet in front of the officers.
James was arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon on
a peace officer.40
specifically intend that result, rather than merely intend to d6 an act with probable
consequences of injury to another. Is there, however, a difference between intending
to touch another and intending to do an act the "direct, natural and probable conse-
quences!' of which would be the touching of another? It appears that the supreme
court has created a distinction which does not really exist in order to bolster its holding
that voluntary intoxication will not negate the intent required for an assault.
38. 9 Cal. 3d 517, 510 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1973).
39. See id. at 521-22, 510 P.2d at 35-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92.
40. Id. at 519, 510 P.2d at 34, 108 Cal. Rptr.'at 90. James'wa also charged
February 1974] ASSAULT-RELATED CONDUCT
The juvenile court ruled that the offense charged had not been es-
tablished by the evidence because James had not struck his alleged
target. Rather than dismissing the charge or convicting James of the
lesser included offense of simple assault on a peace officer, the court
found James guilty of an attempted assault with a deadly weapon on a
peace officer.41 At the disposition hearing which followed, the juvenile
court ignored James's assertion that such offense does not exist under
the law of California and adjudged him a ward of the court. 2
The court of appeal passed over the juvenile court's conclusion
that since James had not struck one of the policemen he could only be
convicted of an attempted assault;43 James's conviction was justified on
another ground. The appellate court utilized the Penal Code's general
attempt provision 4 and thus determined that attempted assault is a
crime in California. It defined attempted assault as an unsuccessful at-
tempt to commit a battery "where the actor lacks the present ability to
consummate it." 45
The supreme court reversed James's conviction. Although the
court conceded that attempted assault as defined by the court of appeal
was a logical application of the general attempt provision, the court
refused to sanction such an application in California. 46  Relying on sec-
tion 6 of the Penal Code which provides that "[n]o act or omission
• . . is criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by
this code""7 as well as on the doctrine of manifested legislative intent
which provides that "an omission from a penal provision evinces a leg-
islative purpose not to punish the omitted act," ' the court decided
unanimously that the legislature had intended that an attempt to com-
mit a battery where present ability was lacking should go unpunished. 9
with disturbing the peace, a violation of Penal Code section 415, but the juvenile court
dismissed the charge because there was insufficient evidence. Id. at 519-20, 510 P.2d
at 34, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
41. Id. at 520, 510 P.2d at 34, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
42. Id. Under the California Welfare and Institutions Code a minor may be ad-
judged a ward of the court if the juvenile court determines that the minor has violated
any state or federal law and finds that, based on evidence presented to the court, ad-
judging the minor a ward of the court is the proper disposition to be made of the
minor. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 602, 701, 702, 725(b) (West 1972 & Supp.
1973).
43. 105 Cal. Rptr. 809, 812 (1972), rev'd, 9 Cal. 3d 517, 510 P.2d 33, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1973).
44. CAL. PEN. CODE § 664 (West 1970).
45. 105 Cal. Rptr. 809, 812 (1972).
46. 9 Cal. 3d at 521, 510 P.2d at 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
47. CAL. PEN. CODE § 6 (West 1970).
48. 9 Cal. 3d at 522, 510 P.2d at 35-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92; see PERKINS,
supra note 7, at 126.
49. 9 Cal. 3d at 522, 510 P.2d at 35-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92.
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Further, because of the established rule of statutory construction that
specific provisions prevail over general provisions, the court determined
that the assault statute necessarily pre-empts the general attempt stat-
ute. ° The supreme court thus concluded that if a California court judi-
cially defined attempted assault as an attempt to commit a battery
without present ability to inflict a violent injury, that court "would
* . * invade the province of the Legislature by redefining the elements
of the underlying crime.""1
As additional support for this conclusion, the supreme court
prophesied that introducing the issue of attempted assault into prosecu-
tions for assault would result in unwarranted reversals; this could oc-
cur because trial courts would have to instruct on the lesser included
offense of attempted assault if the presence of one of the elements of
the charged assault or aggravated assault was uncertain or put in issue.
52
The court further stated that "[jluries should not be required to en-
gage in fruitless metaphysical speculation as to the differing degrees of
proximity between an assault and a general attempt . . .,,1
The importance of James M. lies not only in the supreme court's
determination that attempted assault is not an offense defined by the
Penal Code, but also in the fact that the question arose in the first
place. The confusion surrounding the statutory definition of assault at
the trial and intermediate appellate levels in James M. seems to suggest
that the definition of assault has developed into "something more" than
merely an attempted battery. That is, California courts increasingly
seem to view assault as a substantive rather than as a purely anticipa-
tory crime. It seems likely that a major cause of this metamorphosis is
the statutory scheme of punishments for assault-related offenses in the
Penal Code.
Three basic types of assaults are punished in the Penal Code:
simple assault,54 assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to pro-
duce great bodily harm,5 5 and assaults committed with the intent to
commit some other crime. 56 None of these three crimes requires that
the defendant has inflicted physical injury. Only two crimes punish in-
flictions of physical injury which do not result in death: battery57
50. Id.
51. Id. at 522, 510 P.2d at 36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. CAL. PEN. CODE § 240 (West 1970).
55. Id. § 245 (West Supp. 1973).
56. Id. §§ 217 (with intent to murder), 220 (with intent to commit rape, sodomy,
mayhem, robbery or grand larceny), 221 (with intent to commit any other felony)
(West 1970).
57. Id. § 242.
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and mayhem.58 Battery includes a wide spectrum of injuries from the
slightest touching to serious injuries which do not involve maiming;59
mayhem punishes those inflictions of injury which deprive another
of the use of an organ or limb.60 Significantly, the punishments for bat-
tery, mayhem, and the three types of assaults vary greatly. For exam-
ple, the maximum imprisonment for assault with a deadly weapon is
life, 61 while the maximum imprisonment for battery is six months62
and for mayhem is fourteen years.63 The disparity between possible
punishments may be one of the reasons why district attorneys are more
likely to charge assault with a deadly weapon even if an injury was ac-
tually inflicted.64 Thus, the assault statutes have developed into catchall
provisions under which actual inflictions of injury are punished more
often than attempts to inflict injury are punished. With this under-
standing, it is possible to comprehend why the trial judge in James M.
determined that since James had not struck anyone, he had only at-
tempted an assault.
Criminal Injury and Related Offenses Under the
Proposed California Criminal Code
The proposed California Criminal Code, 5 in a chapter entitled
"Criminal Injury and Related Offenses,"66 would punish actual inflic-
tions of physical injury which do not result in death as well as at-
tempts to inflict physical injury. "Criminal injury" is defined as the use
of "unlawful force upon the person of another."67 This definition is sub-
stantially the same as the current Penal Code's definition of battery68 and
58. Id. § 203.
59. People v. Martinez, 3 Cal. App. 3d 886, 83 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1970); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 242 (West 1970).
60. CAL. PEN. CODE § 203 (West 1970).
61. Id. § 245 (West Supp. 1973).
62. Id. § 243.
63. Id. § 204 (West 1970).
64. PEE, Ns, supra note 7, at 129. "[S]ignificant is the tendency to prosecute
for 'assault' although a battery has clearly been committed." Id. (citations omitted);
see, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 9 (1950); People v. Chavez, 268
Cal. App. 2d 381, 73 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1968); People v. Herd, 220 Cal. App. 2d 847,
34 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1963); People v. Muse, 196 Cal. App. 2d 662, 16 Cal. Rptr. 768
(1961); People v. Thomas, 103 Cal. App. 2d 669, 229 P.2d 836 (1951); People v. Cor-
dero, 92 Cal. App. 2d 196, 206 P.2d 665 (1949); People v. Fuentes, 74 Cal. App. 2d
737, 169 P.2d 391 (1946); People v. Urrutia, 58 Cal. App. 2d 468, 137 P.2d 48
(1943); People v. Petters, 29 Cal. App. 2d 48, 84 P.2d 54 (1938); People v. Henry,
25 Cal. App. 2d 49, 76 P.2d 196 (1938); People v. Guiterrez, 140 Cal. App. 720, 35
P.2d 1046 (1934); People v. Van Every, 133 Cal. App. 354, 24 P.2d 217 (1933).
65. S.B. 39, supra note 2.
66. Id. div. 8, ch. 2.
67. Id. § 7302(a).
68. CAL. PEN. CODE § 242 (West 1970): "A battery is any willful and unlawful
use of force or violence upon the person of another."
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would, therefore, punish conduct which results in the infliction of physi-
cal injuries ranging from the slightest touching which causes no physi-
cal harm to contact which causes serious harm. 69  There is no provi-
sion in the proposed Criminal Code which proscribes the use of unlawful
force against another that results in the deprivation of the use of an
organ or limb, currently defined as the crime of mayhem.70 There-
fore, the proposed offense of "criminal injury" seems to include inflic-
tions of even the most serious physical injury.
In addition to punishing actual inflictions of physical injury, the
chapter also punishes attempts to inflict physical injury upon another
person. Such attempts would be punished as either "aggressive con-
duct" or "aggravated criminal injury."
The Proposed Offense of Aggressive Conduct
A person would commit "aggressive conduct" in situations "when,
having present ability, he attempts to commit a violent injury upon the
person of another." 71 This definition represents no substantial change
from the current Penal Code's definition of simple assault.72  "Aggres-
sive conduct," like the present assault provision 7 3 retains the present
ability requirement and fails to specify the intent required for the com-
mission of the offense.74  But with regard to the intent requirement for
all offenses in which the intent has not been explicitly set forth, the
proposed Criminal Code states that "[u]nless the statute defining an of-
fense expressly requires a specific intent, knowledge, criminal negli-
gence, or ordinary negligence as the culpable mental state, voluntari-
ness satisfies the culpable mental state requirement . . . .", It fur-
ther states that "[a] person acts voluntarily when he consciously and
willingly performs the act or fails to perform the act described in the
statute defining an offense."'7 6 Since the action which would be punished
as aggressive conduct is an attempt to inflict injury, it appears that
in order to commit aggressive conduct a person would have to
have consciously and willingly attempted to inflict a violent injury upon
the person of another. However, it also appears that the offense could
69. See text accompanying notes 57 & 59 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
71. S.B. 39, supra note 2, div. 8, ch. 2 § 7301(a).
72. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 11-37 supra.
74. S.B. 39, supra note 2, div. 8, ch. 2 § 7301(a).
75. Id., div. 4, ch. 1 § 2002(a)(1).
76. Id. § 2002(a) (2). '"The term 'voluntary conduct' in subdivision (a) embod-
ies the concept of general criminal intent. It would exclude, for example, reflex acts,
acts committed during unconsciousness or sleep, and acts committed during hypnosis
or under hypnotic suggestion. 'Voluntary conduct' requires only that the person intend
to engage in conduct; it does not require a specific purpose or motive or an intent
to violate the law." CRImINAL CODE DRA-r, supra note 2, at 30-31.
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be committed if a person consciously and willingly did an act which
constituted an attempt to inflict injury. But there is a marked differ-
ence between these two possible interpretations. In order to attempt
consciously and willingly to inflict injury, a person would have to have
intended to inflict physical injury because it is unlikely that a person
would attempt to inflict injury without actually intending that very re-
sult.77 Since the proposed Criminal Code provides no guidance for de-
termining what constitutes the mens rea for an attempt to commit an of-
fense under the Code, the legislature must intend to adopt the present,
judicially established rule that a specific intent to commit a particular
crime is a necessary element of an attempt to commit that crime.7 8
Thus, if a person consciously and willingly attempts to inflict physical
injury, he must specifically intend to inflict injury in order for the of-
fense of aggressive conduct to have been committed. This is not to
say, however, that a person must intend to inflict a specific type or de-
gree of physical injury; it is necessary only that the person have con-
templated a battery, meaning at least the slightest unlawful touching.7 9
But if, in contradistinction to an intention to inflict physical injury,
the mens rea requirement for aggressive conduct would be satisfied
by consciously and willingly doing an act which constitutes an at-
tempt to inflict a violent injury, a person would not have to intent any
sort of touching at all. Thus, the mens rea requirement would depend
on how the courts would construe the intent element of an attempt to
inflict injury. If the courts decided that an attempt to inflict injury is,
unlike attempts to commit other crimes, merely a voluntary act which
comes dangerously close to resulting in some sort of touching, then
aggressive conduct would be committed by a person who conducted
himself in such a way that a violent injury to another would result if
his act were not in some way interrupted. It also could be argued that
a person would commit aggressive conduct if his act created a substan-
tial risk of inflicting injury to another. Consciously and willingly cre-
ating a substantial risk of inflicting injury to another is a definition of
recklessness. 80 But recklessness was rejected as an acceptable mental
state for attempts to inflict injury by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Carmen.8' However, the effect of defining the mental state
for aggressive conduct as voluntarily doing an act which creates a
substantial risk of causing injury would necessarily overrule the Carmen
holding.
As this discussion demonstrates, the mens rea required for ag-
gressive conduct is just as uncertain as that required for an assault
77. See note 35 supra.
78. See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
79. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
80. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
81. 36 Cal. 2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951).
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under the Penal Code. In addition, it appears that the proposed offense
would perpetuate the confusion surrounding the current definition of as-
sault which led to the juvenile court's misconstruction of the definition
of assault in James M.82 By retaining the current definition of assault
under the new name of "aggressive conduct," the proposed Criminal
Code would do nothing to eliminate that definition's inadequacy to pro-
scribe the type of conduct which the legislature believes to be socially
harmful.
The Proposed Offense of Aggravated Criminal Injury
Like the proposed offense of "aggressive conduct," "aggravated
criminal injury" is essentially a restatement of the current definition of
aggravated assault.a3 The proposed Criminal Code states that "[a] per-
son is guilty of aggravated criminal injury when he commits an assault
upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or by any means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury."84  This definition is sub-
ject to two criticisms. First, the name of the offense, aggravated crimi-
nal injury, could cause confusion; the proposed offense of criminal in-
jury requires the application of unlawful force, while aggravated crim-
inal injury requires only an assault, which has always been defined in
California as requiring no physical contact.85 This problem, created
by an unfortunate choice of terminology, could be easily solved by
changing the title of the offense to "aggravated aggressive conduct."
Second, the definition of aggravated criminal injury uses the term
"assault," which is otherwise abandoned by the proposed Criminal
Code. In order that it conform with the provision for aggressive con-
duct, the definition of aggravated criminal injury should be amended to
state that a person is guilty of aggravated aggressive conduct when he
"commits aggressive conduct with a deadly weapon or by any means
of force likely to produce great bodily injury." If the term "assault"
is retained in the definition of aggravated criminal injury, it is conceiv-
able that the meaning of assault could change through judicial inter-
pretation because assault would no longer be defined by statute. In
several jurisdictions which have not statutorily defined assault, the def-
inition of criminal assault (an attempted battery) has merged with the
tort definition of assault, i.e. the intentional placing of another in rea-
sonable apprehension of receiving a battery.80 If this merger were to
82. See text accompanying notes 38-64 supra.
83. Compare S.B. 39, supra note 2, div. 8, ch. 2 § 7303, with CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 245 (West Supp. 1973).
84. S.B. 39, supra note 2, div. 8, ch. 2, § 7303 (a) (emphasis added).
85. E.g., People v. Helbing, 61 Cal. 620 (1882); People v. McCaffrey, 118 Cal.
App. 2d 611, 258 P.2d 557 (1953).
86. RSTATENmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965); see PERmNs, supra note 7,
at 117.
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occur in California under the proposed Criminal Code, an anomalous
situation would result. That is, aggressive conduct would only punish
attempts to inflict injury whereas aggravated criminal injury would pun-
ish both attempts to inflict injury as well as the placing of another in
apprehension of receiving an injury with a deadly weapon or by force
likely to produce great bodily injury.
The proposed Criminal Code is likely to make no change in the
current definitions of assault and aggravated assault except to assign
different names to each. The legislature has failed to redefine the cur-
rent Penal Code definitions of the assault-related offenses either because
it believes the current assault provisions define these offenses adequately
or because it is not aware of what has been done in other jurisdictions
to improve the definitions of the offenses. As indicated earlier, 7 the
current definitions of these offenses are inadequate; thus, it is necessary
to examine the possible alternatives to them based upon the Model
Penal Code"8 and the New York Penal Law of 1965.9 This concluding
section of the note hopefully will encourage the California Legislature to
amend the proposed Code so that it defines more precisely what conduct
will be punished as harmful to society.
The Trend in the Law of Criminal Assault
The jurisdictions which have recently revised their criminal assault
provisions can be divided into two groups. The first group has fol-
lowed the Model Penal Code and includes Montana, Pennsylvania,
Utah, and Vermont.90 The second group has followed the example of
the New York Penal Law of 1965 and includes Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, and Oregon.9 The difference between these two groups is es-
sentially one of the form in which the various assault-related offenses are
set forth rather than one of the types of conduct which each punishes
as assault-related conduct. The Model Penal Code includes a broadly
drafted provision which punishes both attempts to inflict injury as well
as actual inflictions of injury. 92 The New York Penal Law divides the
conduct which causes injury into three degrees of offenses93 and pun-
87. See text accompanying notes 7-64 supra.
88. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
89. N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1973).
90. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.0-.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962),
with MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-201 to -203 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §H 2701-09 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §H 76-5-102 to -105 (Supp. 1973);
and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, H3 1023-25 (Supp. 1973).
91. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAw H3 120.00-.25 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1973),
with CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. H3 40-3-203 to -208 (Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
H3 53a-59 to -64 (1973); HAWAII REv. STAT. §H 724-1 to -4 (Special Supp. 1973);
and ORE. REV. STAT. H3 165.165-,195 (1971).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
93. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.00-.10 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1973).
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ishes attempts to inflict injury through the application of its general
criminal attempt provision to each of the three degrees of assault.94
Both the Model Penal Code and the New York Penal Law punish reck-
less conduct which creates a risk of causing injury." Further, both
statutory schemes punish tort-related conduct which is an attempt to
place another in apprehension of receiving an injury.96
The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code's definition of assault9 7 punishes two ma-
jor categories of conduct. The first category is simple assault and in-
cludes the common law crimes of assault and battery. 8 In addition,
the definition of simple assault punishes negligent conduct with a deadly
weapon and reckless conduct which causes bodily injury. Finally, the
definition of simple assault punishes attempts to place another in fear
of receiving serious bodily harm. The second category is aggravated
assault and includes both attempts to inflict injury and actual inflictions
of bodily injury with a deadly weapon. 9
The Model Penal Code's definition of attempts to cause bodily in-jury contained within its broad provision for assault-related conduct
differs from the proposed California Criminal Code's definitions of "ag-
94. Compare id. § 110.00, with id. 9H 120.00-.10.
95. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), with
N.Y. PENAL LAw 99 120.20-.25 (McKinney 1967).
96. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962),
with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.15 (McKinney 1967).
97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962):
Assault
(1) Simple Assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily in.
jury to another; or
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious
bodily harm.
(2) Aggravated Assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme in-
difference to the value of human life; or
(b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to an-
other with a deadily [sic] weapon.
98. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
99. While they punish substantially the same conduct as assaults, the Model Pe-
nal Code and the four jurisdictions which have adopted its definition of assault differ
in that the jurisdictions have divided the broad assault provision into two offenses,
simple assault and aggravated assault Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962), with MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-201 to -202 (Supp. 1973);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2701-02 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. H9 76-5-102 to
-103 (Supp. 1973); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1023-24 (Supp. 1973).
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gressive conduct" and "aggravated criminal injury" in four ways. First,
the Model Penal Code requires an attempt to inflict a more serious injury
than the degree of injury required for aggressive conduct or aggra-
vated criminal injury. The Model Penal Code requires an attempt to
cause bodily injury, defined as "physical pain, illness or any impair-
ment of physical condition."' 100 The proposed California Code, how-
ever, requires only an attempt to inflict a violent injury; this has been
judicially defined as the least touching. 10' Thus, the Model Penal
Code's provision for attempts to inflict bodily injury is, at least in this
respect, a narrower definition than that proposed in California.
Second, unlike its counterparts in the proposed California Code,
when read in conjunction with its definition of criminal attempt'10 2 the
Model Penal Code's definition of assault specifically prescribes the mens
rea required for attempts to inflict injury. Under the Model Penal
Code, a person is guilty of an attempt to cause bodily injury if he either
(1) does an act with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it
will cause bodily injury without further conduct on his part or (2) pur-
posely does anything which constitutes a substantial step toward caus-
ing bodily injury.'0 3  The Model Penal Code requires that the person
act purposely'0 4 (with a conscious objective) to cause injury in order
to be guilty of an attempt to cause bodily injury. This requirement
of acting purposely makes the Model Penal Code's definition of assault
more restrictive than the proposed California definitions of aggressive
conduct and aggravated criminal injury, which require only a general
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
101. See text accompanying notes 7-8, 37 supra.
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962):
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the
crime he:
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits
to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause
such result without further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances
as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
See generally Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 571 (1961).
103. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), with
id. § 211.1(1).
104. Id. § 2.02(2) (a): "A person acts purposely with respect to a material ele-
ment of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he
is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes they exist."
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criminal intent to do a violent act."°5 Further, the Model Penal Code has
abandoned the present ability requirement and has replaced it with the
substantial step test; that test is met by conduct "strongly corroborative
of the actor's criminal purpose."' 06 Thus, the Model Penal Code's defini-
tion punishes conduct which would constitute only preparation under
the proposed definition of aggressive conduct. While the Model Pe-
nal Code enlarges the scope of conduct which would be punishable as
an attempt to inflict injury by its failure to require present ability, the
definition has the advantage of bringing attempts to inflict injury in
line with its definition of attempts to commit other crimes. This is de-
sirable because, as it has been demonstrated, 0 7 the tendency in Califor-
nia has been to confuse the definition of assault so that the term means
more than merely an attempt to inflict injury.
Third, unlike the proposed California Code, the Model Penal Code
punishes "attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of immi-
nent serious bodily harm."' 08 This definition punishes tort-related as-
sault but differs from the tort concept in two ways. 0 9 The first differ-
ence is that while the actor needs only to attempt to place another
in fear of imminent injury under the Model Penal Code's definition, un-
der the tort definition it is necessary that the victim actually was put
in apprehension. The second difference is that while the Model Penal
Code requires the fear to be one of receiving serious bodily harm, the
tort definition requires only apprehension of receiving a battery; this ap-
prehension can be one of receiving the least offensive touching." 0
Those jurisdictions which have recently enacted new criminal codes
have all embraced some variety of the tort concept of assault."'
Fourth, the Model Penal Code punishes reckless conduct which
creates a risk of placing another in danger of death or serious bodily
injury." 2 Although reckless conduct is not included with the attempts
105. See note 76 supra.
106. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
107. See text accompanying notes 18-36 supra.
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
109. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
110. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 36 (4th ed. 1971).
111. 'E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
1023 (Supp. 1973). An interesting example is in ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 38, § 12-1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973): "A person commits an assault when, without lawful author-
ity, he engages in conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving
a battery." This is the closest that any criminal statute has come to the tort definition
of assault.
. 112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962): "A person
commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Recklessness and danger
shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction
of another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded."
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to inflict batteries under the common law, reckless conduct has been
statutorily proscribed in many jurisdictions." 3  For example, the cur-
rent California Penal Code punishes a variety of reckless acts which
include throwing a hard substance at a public conveyance,"' dropping
an object from a toll bridge," 5 and operating machinery near high volt-
age overhead conductors." 6 Perhaps the best example of this kind of
legislation was the enactment in 1951 of an offense which punishes
anyone failing to remove the latch from a refrigerator which is no longer
in use." 7 The characteristic similarity between these offenses is that
the legislature enacted each offense in order to punish one particular
type of reckless conduct which creates a risk of death or serious injury
that far outweighs the utility of the conduct. In order to avoid the con-
sequence of continuous new enactments of reckless conduct offenses
each of which deals with only one specific type of reckless conduct, the
Model Penal Code punishes all reckless conduct which creates a sub-
stantial risk of serious injury."18
Comparison Between the Model Penal Code
and The New York Penal Law
The treatment of assault-related conduct in the New York Penal
Law is useful here to demonstrate a method of delineating the assault-
related offenses which is different from that of the Model Penal Code.
The New York Penal Law punishes substantially the same conduct as at-
tempted assault that the Model Penal Code punishes as attempts to
cause bodily injury under its definition of assault. While the Model Pe-
nal Code contains one provision which punishes attempts to inflict in-
jury and actual inflictions of injury, the New York Penal Law contains
three different degrees of assault offenses which punish only inflictions
of injury." 9 Attempts to inflict injury are punished by applying the gen-
113. 'See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
114. CAL. PEN. CODE § 219.2 (West 1970).
115. Id. § 219.3.
116. Id. § 385.
117. Id. § 402b.
118. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
119. The statutory scheme for assault-related offenses in New York is as follows:
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 1968):
A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:
1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury
to such person or to a third person; or
2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or
3. With criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
Id. § 120.05 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1973):
A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such
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eral attempt provision to each of the three degrees of assault.120  The
New York Penal Law punishes the intentional placing or attempt to place
another in apprehension of receiving serious physical injury as a sepa-
rate offense entitled "menacing."'' Further, the offense of reckless
endangerment is divided into two degrees: 122 one punishing reckless
conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury and the other
punishing reckless conduct which creates a risk of death.
Although assault-related conduct is divided into narrower offenses
in the New York Penal Law, the progressive severity of punishments as-
signed to specific unlawful acts is essentially the same in both the New
York Penal Law and the Model Penal Code. For example, the New York
Penal Law prescribes identical punishments for attempts to inflict phys-
ical injury and attempts to place another in apprehension of receiving
physical injury despite the fact that they are defined as the separate of-
injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury
to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument; or
3. With intent to prevent a peace officer or a fireman or an employee of the
narcotic addiction control commission who is charged with the duty of securing
the custody of a certified or detained alleged narcotic addict from performing a
lawful duty, he causes physical injury to such peace officer or fireman or em-
ployee; or
4. He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument ....
Id. § 120.10 (McKinney 1967):
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such
injury to such person or a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dan-
gerous instrument; or
2. With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to de-
stroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes
such injury to such person or to a third person; or
3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he reck-
lessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person,
and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or
4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commis-
sion of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if
there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person other than one of the par-
ticipants.
See generally Byrn, Assault, Battery and Maiming in New York: From Common Law
Origins to Enlightened Revision, 34 FORDHAm L. REv. 613, 638-47 (1966); Note,
64 COLUm. L. Rnv. 1469, 1527-31 (1964).
120. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 110.00 (McKinney 1967): "A person is guilty of an
attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct
which tends to effect the commission of such crime."
121. Id. § 120.15: "A person is guilty of menacing when, by physical menace,
he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of- imminent serious
physical injury."
122. Id. §§ 120.20-.25.
February 19741 ASSAULT-RELATED CONDUCT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
fenses of "attempted assault in the third degree" and "menacing."' 23
The Model Penal Code punishes both types of conduct as simple as-
saults with identical punishment for each. 124  Further comparison be-
tween similar assault-related conduct defined in the two Codes reveals
that in each statutory scheme, the seriousness of the several types of as-
sault-related conduct is directly reflected in the increasing punishments
assigned to each. The only major difference between the two Codes
is that in the Model Penal Code attempts to inflict injury and actual
inflictions of injury are punished equally while under the New York Penal
Law attempts to inflict injury are punished less severely than actual in-
flictions of injury. 12 5 Despite this difference, not only do both Codes
punish the same types of assault-related conduct, they also both assign
punishments to that conduct in the same order of severity.
Summary of the Trend in the Law of Criminal Assault
A definite trend toward similarly defining assault-related conduct
has been demonstrated by the recent revisions of the assault-related
offenses in the nine jurisdictions. 26 There are five basic characteris-
tics of this trend. First, the essential elements of the assault-related
offenses are defined with particularity; both the requisite mens rea and
the degree of injury required are statutorily defined.' 27 Second, it is only
the attempts to inflict injury rather than mere attempts to offensively
touch another person which are punishable. 28  Third, the common
law definition of assault has been replaced by definitions which treat at-
tempts to inflict injury as they do other attempts to commit crimes.
This is manifested by the elimination of the requirement of present abil-
ity and the specific requirement that a person must intend to cause injury
to be guilty of an attempt to inflict injury.12 9 Fourth, the tort definition
of assault has been included in the definitions of criminal assault. 130
Fifth, reckless conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury or
death is punished as a general offense; that offense replaces those offenses
which punish specific reckless acts, and it anticipates future enactments
123. Compare id. §§ 110.04, 120.00, with id. § 120.15 (McKinney 1967 & Supp.
1973).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
125. Compare id., with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
126. See notes 90-96 & accompanying text supra.
127. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a), 5.01(1)(b)-(c), 210.0(2)-(3),
211.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), with N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00(9)-(10),
110.00, 120.00-.25 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1973).
128. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.0(2)-(3), 211.1 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962), with N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00(9)-(10), 120.00-.25 (McKinney 1967 &
Supp. 1973).
129. See notes 102-07 & accompanying text supra.
130. See notes 108-11 & accompanying text supra.
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punishing other reckless acts.131 By only punishing attempts to inflict in-
jury rather than merely offensive contact, as well as by requiring an in-
tent to cause injury, the Model Penal Code and the New York Penal
Law restrict the scope of punishable conduct. However, by elimi-
nating the present ability requirement and by punishing both the tort
definition of assault and reckless conduct, both Codes enlarge the scope
of punishable conduct. In general, the established trend is a marked
departure from the common law definition of criminal assault, replacing
it with a particularized list of assault-related conduct.
Conclusion
In contrast to the new definitions of assault which have been
adopted in nine states, the proposed California Criminal Code definitions
of "aggressive conduct" and "aggravated criminal injury" would not
make any substantial change in the current Penal Code definition of as-
sault.13 2 In light of the trend in other jurisdictions to modify the com-
mon law definition of assault and considering the confusion which sur-
rounds the present definition of assault in California, the legislature
should amend the proposed assault-related offenses to define with
greater particularity the types of conduct which will be punished.
In order for the new Criminal Code to provide a framework for ju-
dicial administration, the legislature should specify the mens rea required
for attempts to inflict injury. Further, it should consider punishing the
tort definition of assault and creating a general provision which would
punish reckless conduct. Finally, the legislature should define in unam-
biguous language the essential elements of the assault-related offenses.
Toward this end, the California Legislature should regard the assault pro-
visions of the Model Penal Code and the New York Penal Law both as a
guide in considering ways to improve the current Penal Code definition
of assault and as a challenge to enact a new Criminal Code which pro-
scribes exactly the types of assault-related conduct which should be pun-
ished.
Gerald M. Hinkley*
131. See notes 112-18 & accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 65-89 & accompanying text supra.
* Member, Second Year Class
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